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Questions and Answers Regarding
Industrial Cooperation Contracts
QUESTION: You mentioned in discussing know-how agreements how you
could not expect to have more than one know-how agreement on the same technology for the same country, which I understand. My question is whether you
are aware of any evidence of leakage, let's say, of know-how passing between
two Eastern countries.
MR. HERTZFELD:

To my knowledge, there has not been. From the record,

Eastern contract performance and their respect of confidentiality appear to be
very good. It should be remembered that, in a foreign trade monopoly system, a
clear breach of contract will reflect not only upon the particular foreign trade
corporation but on the business reputation of the country as a whole. The consequences for the bureaucrats involved in a wilful breach would be far reaching,
including administrative and even criminal sanctions. This creates a strong
incentive to act conservatively and to observe the black letter of the contract.
QUESTION: I would like to ask each of the panelists whether they could
mention one unforeseen contract drafting problem which later caused trouble,
or one which was foreseen but could not be dealt with.
MR. HERTZFELD:

One such case arose recently where a Western seller

undertook to supply a scale model of a product as part of his delivery
obligations, but the parties had failed to define the degree of required detail in
the model. The result was a costly delay in payment until the problem was
ironed out. The description of what is to be delivered needs to be defined as
precisely as possible in the contract. It should not be assumed that the Eastern
party will apply the same interpretation as a Western party might with respect
to ambiguous delivery obligations.
MR. POPE: We had an experience about seven years ago in connection with
the transfer of technology for construction of a plant. Our agreement specified
how many engineers and how many man-months we owed the other party to
help them in starting up the plant. At startup the plant did not perform as
expected, so we fulfilled the terms of the contract by sending a number of
engineers for the specified number of man-months; but it still didn't work. We
were thus faced with the problems of sending additional manpower at our
expense or at their expense. The area of disagreement was not only whether we
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had given enough manpower, but whether we had fulfilled our obligation to
make that'plant work. We ended up sending people there at the other party's
cost until the plant did work.
MR. GUFFEY: One item I would like to mention is fixed price. At the beginning of the negotiations, the Russians had no feel for escalation. Now, think
of the time I am speaking of, the last part of '73 and early '74, when we had the
biggest escalation the United States has experienced in my lifetime. In the
United States you couldn't go to any engineering company and get a fixed price,
lump-sum contract, but this was something the Russians had to have. They
don't have escalation, to speak of, in the Soviet Union. We couldn't get fixed
prices from our equipment suppliers, yet the Russians wanted us to give a lumpsum fixed-price contract. Without a provision for escalation, all we could have
done was to keep adding contingency on contingency. In the end we did agree to
a maximum of 10 percent escalation on the base contract price.
One other problem area involved our cash flow. The Russians have a
standard form of repayment in the engineering contract field. As we looked at
it, for a two- or three-year period for technical documentation, design, supply,
construction, and so forth, under their original proposal we would have a
positive cash flow for about five months, and the rest of the time we would have
to borrow money to put in the project. By showing them that all we could do
would be add to the price for the interest on borrowed money, in the end we got
them to agree to a 10 percent down payment and then some progress payments.
This kept our cash flow positive for about a year, although we then went into a
negative position and came back into a positive position at the end of the
project. We made a little headway in our negotiations on this point, but we
didn't get the whole thing.
QuEsTION: Did I detect a difference of opinion on the panel as to whether
you should go to the Eastern bloc countries with your own draft in the first place
and try to use your form?
MR. POPE: I didn't say you don't go with your own text. I said, don't use
your standardform. In other words, try to draft something that you expect to be
at least possibly acceptable to them, but don't use your standard form. For
example, don't take your standardforce majeure clause and plug it there. Try to
simplify it so it is compatible with their circumstances. For example, there is no
such thing as a "strike" over there, so eliminate that provision and make the
clause simple.
MR. HERTZFELD: Basically, I agree with Mr. Pope. You should not
submit your standard form contract and expect it to be a basis for the
negotiations. You are more likely to achieve your objectives if you design a
contract which will be familiar to the Eastern side in structure while acceptable
to you in content.
As to force majeure clauses, it is no longer possible to generalize about
Eastern practice. Strikes are sometimes included as force majeure circumInternationalLawyer. Vol. 10. No. I
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stances in contracts with Eastern European countries. The Soviet Union, as a
matter of customary policy, has rejected strikes as force majeure, but still I have
seen three contracts signed by Soviet organizations in which strikes were nonetheless explicitly listed as a case of force majeure.
As I have pointed out earlier, almost everything is negotiable and the limits
are being stretched daily, so you should take an imaginative approach in
developing a draft and a negotiating strategy.
QUESTION: Mr. Pope, would you kindly give some additional explanation
of your last sentence to the effect that a position of force may be more effective
than any arbitration clause?
MR. POPE: I don't think I was trying to convey the concept of force written
into an agreement. I was trying to see to what extent, in case of default, you can
force your partner to perform, thereby avoiding this arbitration thing, which is
unrealistic anyhow in some instances.
I was talking in terms of, let's say, an automatic penalty of one sort or
another. Perhaps I exaggerated the point by saying that if you don't supply us
that material, we will not supply our share of the other material you need; or, as
you have in construction agreements, written penalties for delays or non-preformance. In other words, there is no use in discussing at length whether force
majeure includes strikes. You know that it is not a worthwhile proposition to
discuss, so forget about it. In Eastern Europe I found that continually trying to
insert clauses for non-performance, such as referring to arbitration, is a little bit
unrealistic.
QUESTION: Could someone bring us up to date with respect to governing law
clauses?
MR. HERTZFELD: Here, again, you have to distinguish between Eastern
European countries and the Soviet Union. In Soviet contracts, the choice-oflaw provision usually follows the choice of arbitral forum. Since most contracts
with Western firms generally call for arbitration of disputes in Stockholm, the
typical approach calls for Swedish choice-of-law rules to apply. Under Swedish
principles, this will in most cases refer the arbitrators back to Soviet substantive law, as the law of the place where the contract was signed, where most of the
performance takes place, where the payments are made, and so forth. In some
cases, the Russians will accept the application of Swedish substantive law, excluding Swedish choice-of-law rules, which at least assures the Western party of
a neutral body of law equally accessible to both parties.
Of course, to the extent that you define rights and obligations clearly in the
contract, the need to refer to any provisions of national law will be reduced.
The governing law alternatives are more varied in contracts with the different
Eastern European countries, although the most frequent preference seems to be
the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations.
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